Water and Watercourses—Federal Jurisdiction—Federal Common Law Determines Ownership of Re-Exposed Navigable River Beds—Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973) by Hopp, Richard A.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 50 
Number 3 Symposium: Law and Education 
6-1-1975 
Water and Watercourses—Federal Jurisdiction—Federal Common 
Law Determines Ownership of Re-Exposed Navigable River 
Beds—Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973) 
Richard A. Hopp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
Digital 
Commons 
Network 
Logo 
 Part of the Water Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard A. Hopp, Recent Developments, Water and Watercourses—Federal Jurisdiction—Federal Common 
Law Determines Ownership of Re-Exposed Navigable River Beds—Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 
313 (1973), 50 Wash. L. Rev. 777 (1975). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol50/iss3/12 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WATER AND WATERCOURSEs-FEDERAL JURISDICTION-FEDERAL COM-
MON LAW DETERMINES OWNERSHIP OF BE-EXPOSED NAVIGABLE
RIVER BEDs-Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)
Plaintiff Bonelli Cattle Company (Bonelli) brought a quiet title ac-
tion against the State of Arizona to determine ownership of newly re-
emerged land purchased by Bonelli in 1955 from a federal grantee,
the Santa Fe Railroad. When the Santa Fe obtained the parcel in
1910, it comprised 280 acres of dry land. In that year the Colorado
River, a navigable stream,1 formed the boundary between Arizona
and Nevada and flowed more than one-quarter mile to the west. How-
ever, the Colorado moved slowly eastward so that in 1955 it covered
all but 60 acres of the parcel.2 The submerged portion was re-exposed
as a result of dredging and rechannelization of the river in 1959 and
1960 by the United States Bureau of Reclamation. The trial court and
the intermediate appellate court upheld Bonelli's claim3 to the re-ex-
posed portion of the parcel. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the re-emergence was caused by artificial, avulsive forces,
and hence under state law the re-exposed land belonged to the state
(whose title to the river bed had moved with the river).4 On certiorari
the United States Supreme Court reversed. Held: Under the federal
common law of accretion, a state's ownership of the newly exposed
1. The river is navigable not because it ever was or could have been an artery of
commerce, but because the United States Supreme Court found it to be so when de-
ciding that the Boulder Canyon Act of 1928 was constitutional under the commerce
clause. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (193 1).
2. Operation of Hoover Dam reduced the Colorado's flow and checked its en-
croachment of the land. Thus, the 60 remaining acres of fastland in the parcel stayed
relatively intact from 1938 until 1955 when Bonelli purchased it. See United States
v. Claridge, 279 F. Supp. 87, 89-90 (D. Ariz. 1967), affd, 416 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1969); Note, Artificial Additions to Riparian Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accre-
tion, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 315, 331 (1972).
3. 11 Ariz. App. 412, 464 P.2d 999 (1970). The Arizona Court of Appeals held
that Bonelli received title under either the "artificial accretion theory" or the doctrine
of re-emergence. 464 P.2d at 1005-06. Under the artificial accretion theory, Bonelli
as riparian owner was entitled to accretions resulting from conditions created by third
persons in which it had no part. Id. at 1005. Under the re-emergence doctrine, the
river must inundate riparian land so that adjoining nonriparian land becomes riparian;
then the river must return to its original bed so that the submerged riparian land
re-emerges. Id. at 1006, citing Beaver v. United States, 350 F.2d 4, 11 (9th Cir. 1965).
See Herron v. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations, 228 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1956); Hun-
zicker v. Kleeden, 161 Okla. 102, 17 P.2d 384 (1932); Allard v. Curran, 41 S.D. 73,
168 N.W. 761 (1918).
4. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699 (1971). The opinion
of the Arizona Supreme Court is analyzed in Note, Artificial Additions to Riparian
Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 315 (1972).
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bed of an inland navigable waterway is defeasible in favor of the ri-
parian federal grantee, absent the state's showing of any need to pro-
tect a public benefit or purpose. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414
U.S. 313 (1973).5
Broadly applied, Bonelli effectively clouds the title to large
amounts of real property adjacent to "navigable water" 6 in western,
public lands states. It represents a significant intrusion of federal
common law into an area previously thought reserved for the states.
This note will explore the pre-and post-Bonelli status of the equal
footing doctrine,7 of state riparian property rights and of federal
common law effects on those rights. The reasoning in Bonelli will be
critically examined in light of prior doctrine. It will be shown that
Bonelli represents an unwarranted and unmanageable extension of
federal law into areas reserved for the states. This note concludes that
the doctrinal infirmity of Bonelli's reasoning, and the impracticality of
its enunciated rule, mandate that the decision be limited to its own
peculiar facts.
I. THE LAW PRIOR TO BONELLI
A. The Equal Footing Doctrine
In 1845, the United States Supreme Court held that each new state
is "admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the Original
States ,. . ."8 The Court reiterated this doctrine some 20 years later
5. Justice Stewart, in a vigorous lone dissent, argued that the Court's holding
emasculated the time-honored equal footing doctrine, see Part I-A infra, and in-
advisedly required states other than the original 13 and Texas to "knuckle under to
this Court's supervisory view of 'federal common law."' 414 U.S. at 336.
6. The term "navigable" is used to decide a host of legal relationships covering
title, rights of use and powers to legislate. See Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights
and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RES. J. 1, 4-5 (1967);
Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WASH. L. REv. 580
(1960).
7. See Part I-A infra.
8. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845). The doctrine
that states newly admitted to the Union would enter with the same rights and sov-
ereignty as accorded to the original 13 states, is fundamental to the federal system
of government as conceived when several individual colonies banded together to form
our nation. Indeed, an early draft of the United States Constitution provided that
"the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original states." See The
Constitution as Reported by the Committee of Detail, Aug. 6, 1787, art. XVII, in C.
ROSSITER, 1787 THE GRAND CONVENTION 328 (1966). Several theories have been of-
fered to explain the omission of this clause from the final draft of the Constitution. One
theory attributes the omission to the fear of the Atlantic states, particularly Pennsyl-
vania, that the new states would have too much power if admitted on an equal basis.
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 583 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
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declaring that new states have the same "right, sovereignty, and juris-
diction. . . as the original states possess within their respective bor-
ders." 9 Coyle v. Smith' o represents the Court's fullest constitutional
justification for the equal footing doctrine. In Coyle, the Court held
that Congress could not impose conditions on admission of a state
that would limit that state's sovereignty. The Court reasoned that
each state must be admitted with equal power, dignity and authority.
To allow Congress to condition admission would mean that the power
of the original 13 states would be limited only by the Constitution,
while that of the new states would also be restricted by the conditions
Congress sought to impose. Moreover, allowing conditional admission
would enlarge Congressional powers vis-a-vis the new states by the
conditions so imposed in contradiction of the tenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Court concluded that "the constitu-
tional equality of the states is essential to the harmonious operation of
the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.""
One aspect of state sovereignty under the equal footing doctrine is
the absolute ownership of the beds below the high water mark' 2 of
navigable waters within the state.' 3 This ownership is derived from the
Another suggests the omission was part of the price South Carolina paid to Pennsyl-
vania in order to secure a political compromise on the slavery issue. C. WARREN , THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 596 (2d ed. 1937). Finally, the clause may have been
thought unnecessary in light of the Resolution of October 10, 1780 and the North-
west Ordinance of 1787, in which the Continental Congress had already guaranteed
equal footing to new states. See generally id. at 590-98.
9. Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423,436 (1867).
10. -221 U.S. 559 (1911). Coyle involved the validity of a section in the Enabling
Act admitting Oklahoma into the Union which provided that that state's capital
would be located in Guthrie, Oklahoma until 1913. In December 1910, the Oklahoma
Legislature provided for removal of the capital to Oklahoma City. Coyle, a citizen of
Guthrie owning large amounts of land there, challenged the proposed move, urging
that it was contrary to the Enabling Act. On appeal from a judgment of the Okla-
homa Supreme Court upholding the act authorizing removal, the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed. The Court held that the power to locate its own seat of
government is essentially a state power which Congress cannot withhold from a state
by conditioning its admission to the Union. To allow Congress to do so would create
a union of states unequal in power, for Congress could reserve for itself some powers
belonging to newly admitted states. Congress' powers would thus be enlarged beyond
those granted by the Constitution as to those states which had bargained away such
powers as conditions to admission. See generally Hanna, Equal Footing in the Ad-
mission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 519 (1951).
11. 221 U.S. at 567. Clearly, the doctrine does not guarantee equality of economic
stature. This plainly is not possible since area, location and natural resources will
cause great differences in economic power. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716(1950).
12. The high water mark constitutes the limit below which the United States
cannot convey since the land belongs to the state under the equal footing doctrine.
Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 672 (1891).
13. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,410 (1842).
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United States which holds the submerged beds of navigable waterways
in federal territories in trust for future states. 14 The federal govern-
ment could convey the beds of navigable waters located in territories
for certain purposes, but has never done so in any wholesale fashion. 15
Upon statehood, the states in turn must hold the beds in trust for
public purposes, such as navigation and fishery. But the state has the
right to convey the land received upon statehood to private individ-
uals.1 6 In addition, the Court has traditionally respected the state's
power to decide under its own law the rights of a riparian owner to
the bed of a stream or other body of water, whether navigable' 7 or
non-navigable. 18
B. State Jurisdiction over the Incidents of Title
In Packer v. Bird,'9 the Court held that the incidents and rights
attaching to the ownership of property conveyed by the federal gov-
ernment are to be determined by state law. 20 The Packer Court care-
fully noted, however, that state law could neither define the extent of a
federal grant nor impair its efficacy or the use or enjoyment of the
14. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49(1894).
15. See id. at 51 (Congress has "settled policy of not granting to individuals lands
under . . . navigable rivers."); accord, United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49.
55 (1926); United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764. 767 (9th Cir. 1967).
16. 152 U.S. at 56. This was the source of dispute in Shively. The plaintiff had
purchased from the State of Oregon certain tidelands along the Columbia River. The
defendant purchased upland property from the United States and claimed the plain-
tiff's land as part of that grant. The Court held for plaintiff finding that Oregon could
convey the land in question since it owned and controlled it. Id. at 53.
17. Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U.S. 117, 126 (1972), Fox River Paper Co. v. Rail-
road Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927): Packer v. Bird. 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
18. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations
v. Seay, 235 F.2d 30, 35 (10th Cir. 1956). If the body of water is non-navigable.
the title of the United States to the submerged land remains unaffected by the ad-
mission to the Union of the state in which the waterway is located. United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). When the federal government conveys the surround-
ing upland, the rights of the grantee to the submerged bed are determined under
common law which recognizes grantee's rights in the submerged land up to the center
of the stream. Hardin v. Jordan, supra at 384.
19. 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
20. Id. at 670. In Packer, the Court was asked to determine whether a federal gran-
tee's patent stopped at the high water mark of the stream or extended to its middle.
The Court reasoned that since Congress meant to preserve for the states ownership
of the beds of navigable streams, a federal patent must be construed to extend only
to the high water mark of a navigable stream. If a state wished to define riparian
rights to include part of the stream bed which belonged to the state, then the Court
would not interfere; it was up to the state to determine whether to resign its rights in
the beds to the bordering riparian owners. See also Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332
(1906) (federal grantee's action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that
ownership of accreted land is governed by state law).
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property granted.21 But, as the Court noted in St. Anthony Falls Wa-
ter-Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Com'rs:22
It does not impair the efficacy of the grant, or the use and enjoyment
of the property by the grantee, to hold that riparian rights are to be
decided by the state courts, inasmuch as the grant, if by the federal
government, has been held . . . not to include title over navigable
waters within or bounded by the states.
Moreover, the Court suggested in Shively v. Bowlby23 that the prin-
ciple that state law governs the adjudication of riparian property
rights is necessarily implied from the equal footing doctrine:24
[T] he new states admitted into the Union since the adoption of the
constitution have the same rights as the original states in the tide wa-
ters, and in the lands under them, within their respective jurisdictions.
The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below
high-water mark, therefore, are governed by the laws of the several
states, subject to the rights granted to the United States by the con-
stitution.
Nonetheless, federal common law 5 has been fashioned in at least
21. 137 U.S. at 669. Thus, a state rule of property which extended the high water
mark beyond the federal definition, thereby reducing the amount of land in a federal
grant, would be ineffective.
22. 168 U.S. 349, 363 (1897).
23. 152 U.S. I (1894).
24. Id. at 57-58.
25. To speak of federal common law is also to speak of state common law, for
the two complement each other and the role of one limits the role of the other. State
law deals with and is responsible for governing most problems of "private behavior
which have failed of satisfactory adjustment at either the private or local level."
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 492
(1954). Thus, the states have developed a vast, valuable reservoir of law for re-
solving controversies for which there would otherwise be no law. Furthermore, it is
assumed that state legal systems are "competent ... to handle most of the immediate
exigencies of government, even in spheres which were subject to a power of control
by the United States." Id. at 497.
This is not to say that there is no need for federal "common law." The ability to
create and declare what is the federal law is essential to the effective implementation
of federal legislation. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decisions, 105 U. PENN.
L. REV. 797, 799 (1957). A federal court must be able to interpret the meaning, and
fill the interstices, of a federal statute, to apply it to particular problems and to fashion
remedies to carry out the law. But the mere fact that the activity is federal is not
sufficient. The Court has said that state rules should be overridden by federal courts
"only where clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot
be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage
if the state law is applied." United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). See
also Comment, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1517 (1969).
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three areas to govern issues-none of which was present in Bonelli-
arising from property disputes. First, since at the time of statehood the
federal government releases to the newly formed state all land beneath
"navigable" waters26 and can convey title to riparian property only to
the "high water mark" 27 of a navigable body of water, federal law
must govern the determination of "navigability" and "high water
mark" for purposes of determining the extent of a federal grant.2 8 As
the Court noted in United States v. Oregon:2 9
Since the effect upon title to such lands is the result of federal action
in admitting a state to the Union, the question, whether the waters
within the state under which the lands lie are navigable or nonnaviga-
ble, is a federal, not a local one. It is, therefore, to be determined ac-
cording to the law and usages recognized and applied in the federal
courts ....
Second, federal law must govern property disputes when national
sovereignty is at issue. Thus in United States v. California,30 the Court
held that protection and control of submerged seabeds out to the 3-
mile limit was a function of national sovereignty and was necessary to
the assertion by the federal government of its rights under interna-
26. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931). The Court held that Utah's own
test of navigability did not govern the question of whether title to the beds of certain
rivers, including portions of the Colorado, was held by the State of Utah. Id. at 75.
As previously noted, title to the submerged bed passes to the state only if the waters
are navigable. See note 18 supra.
27. Of course, state law may extend the limit of the grant by conferring upon
riparian owners rights to the low water mark or even the thread of a navigable
stream. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447 (1908).
"The bed of the river could not be conveyed by the patent of the United States alone,
but, if such is the law of the state, the bed will pass to the patentee by the help of
that law .... " Id. at 451; accord, Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1903).
28. Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22 (1935).
29. 295 U.S. I, 14 (1935), citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
30. 332 U.S. 19 (1947). The United States brought an action against California.
seeking a declaration that the bed of the marginal sea belonged to the United States.
California claimed that it owned the land as part of its sovereign rights. The Court
noted that the original states had never claimed a 3-mile ocean belt, and that the
limit was a later creation of the federal government. The Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed the claim of the United States to the bed of the marginal sea in United
States v. Maine, 95 S. Ct. 1155 (1975). Again the United States had brought an ac-
tion against Maine and other Atlantic coastal states, which claimed the marginal
seabed beyond 3 miles as successors in title to grantees of the Crown of England. The
Court rejected the states' claim, citing United States v. California and emphasizing
that paramount rights in the marginal sea and seabed were incidents of national
sovereignty.
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tional law.31 Similarly, in Shively v. Bowlby,32 the Court held that
Congress could convey beds beneath navigable waters in order to
meet international treaty obligations33 and to promote international
commerce. 34 More recently, the Court in Hughes v. Washington35
extended its national sovereignty rationale to allow federal law to
govern issues concerning the rights of federal grantees to tideland ac-
cretions: 36
The rule [of Borax Consolidated v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10
(1935), that the issue of rights asserted under a federal grant raises a
federal question] deals with waters that lap both the lands of the State
and the boundaries of the international sea. This relationship, at this
particular point of the marginal sea, is too close to the vital interest of
the Nation in its own boundaries to allow it to be governed by any law
but the "supreme Law of the Land."
Third, federal common law is necessary to adjudicate interstate
31. It was the national interest in foreign affairs which empowered Congress to
convey the submerged beds of navigable waters in federal territories, even though the
land was held in trust for future states. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 221-22 (1845); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49 (1894). Six years after
United States v. California, Congress quitclaimed its rights in submerged beds of the
marginal sea out to the 3-mile limit by the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301
et seq. (1970).
32. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
33. An example is the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico which recog-
nized title conveyed by Mexican land grants. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits,
and Settlement with Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (1851), T.S. No. 207 (effective
July 4, 1848).
34. The Court specifically noted, however, that Congress had never attempted to
convey the lands by general laws. 152 U.S. at 48.
35. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
36. Id. at 293. Hughes originated as a quiet title action brought in state court by
the successor in title to the original federal grantee of land on the Washington coast.
The State of Washington, as owner of the tidelands, was the defendant. The issue
before the Court was whether article XVII, § I of the Washington State Constitution
denied the owner of upland property the right to future accretions. (Article XVII,
§ I asserts the ownership by the State of Washington to the beds and shores of all
navigable waters in the state up to the line of ordinary high water mark, including
both tidelands and the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes.) The land in question
had been conveyed to the plaintiff's predecessor in title prior to Washington's ad-
mission into the Union in 1889. Although the trial court found that the right to
accretion was subject to federal law, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding
that under Washington law, the state owned any land accreted after statehood. Hughes
v. State, 67 Wn. 2d 799, 410 P.2d 20 (1966). The United States Supreme Court re-
versed. Although noting that the principal case relied tpon, Borax Consol. v. City of
Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), did not involve accretions, the Hughes Court did
find relevant the assertion in Borax that the extent of ownership under a federal grant
is governed by federal law. 389 U.S. at 292. The Hughes Court went on to decide
783
Washington Law Review Vol. 50: 777, 1975
boundary disputes.37 The constitutional grant of judicial power 38 al-
lows the Court to create federal law to govern such controversies. In
such cases, the application of state law would be unworkable since
there would be no more reason to apply one state's law than the oth-
er's. Over the years the Court has developed an interstate common
law to be applied in ascertaining the relative rights of states. In cre-
ating this federal common law, the Court considers federal, state and
international law. The result is a body of law which follows the
common law of most states concerning accretion and avulsion.39
II. THE COURT'S REASONING IN BONELLI
The dispute between Bonelli and the United States arose out of the
rechannelization of the Colorado in 1959 and 1960 as part of a fed-
that under federal law, the federal grantee of uplands had a right to any future ac-
cretions.
The application of Borax to accretion disputes resulted from a misinterpretation of
the following language: "The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is.
as to the limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between the upland and the
tideland, is necessarily a federal question." 296 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added). Borax
decided only the boundary line of the federal grant, which in the case of tidelands was
held to be the line of mean high tide as averaged over the 18.6 year tidal cycle. The
only federal question involved in Borax was the definition of "mean high tide," the
functional equivalent of "high water mark" on navigable streams and lakes. Id. As
previously explained, see text accompanying notes 26-28 supra, the Court has al-
ways held that the definition of high water mark of navigable waterways is governed
by federal law. Thus, Borax does not support the contention in Hughes that the
right to future accretions to federally patented land is always a federal question.
Moreover, the Court in Hughes ignored, as did the Court in Bonelli, a precedent
more directly in point-Joy v. St. Louis. 201 U.S. 332 (1906). Joy involved an action
for ejectment of the defendant from lands created by accretion, which had attached
to the plaintiff's federally patented riverfront land. The Court affirmed a dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction holding that ownership of the accretive land was to be decided
under state, not federal law. The Court held that the mere fact that the accretions
attached to federally patented land did not produce a federal question since the ac-
cretions involved were clearly not a part of the land originally conveyed. Id. at 343.
Thus, the only possible reading of Hughes which does not conflict with Borax or Joy
is one which construes Hughes as deciding that federal law controls the ownership
of accretions when the land is bordered by the "international sea" on an international
boundary thesis. See Hughes, 389 U.S. at 293.
For further discussion of Borax in relation to Hughes and the problem of de-
termining the "mean high tide" line, see Corker. Where Does the Beach Begin, and to
What Extent Is This a Federal Question, 42 WASH. L. REV. 33, 54-72 (1966). See also
Beck, Hughes v. Washington: Some Federal Common Law in the Real Property Area,
47 N.D.L. REV. 77 (1970).
37. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 302 (1974): Arkansas v. Tennessee.
246 U.S. 158 (1918).
38. U.S. CONST. art. ttl, § 2.
39. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931). For discussion of
the doctrines of accretion and avulsion, see notes 42 & 43 infra.
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eral reclamation project. The project's purpose was to deepen and
narrow the river channel so as to reduce evaporation losses. As the
river was dredged, mud was piled on Bonelli's shore. The dredging
process apparently stirred up large amounts of sediment, thereby facil-
itating the deposits on Bonelli's land. The result was the "re-emerg-
ence" of much of the land which had been gradually inundated by the
Colorado's eastward movement between 1910. and 193 8.40
It was not possible, however, to determine accurately to what de-
gree the exposure of the Bonelli's land was natural rather than artifi-
cial. If the Colorado had dried up or moved gradually, the ownership
question 41 would have been decided by the application of the accre-
tion rule.4 Thus, the land exposed would belong to Bonelli under
Arizona law, the common law of most states and the federal law as
understood prior to Bonelli. On the other hand, if the river's move-
ment was determined to be sudden and noticeable, then the avulsion
rule would apply and the property boundaries would remain un-
changed.43 Because it considered the movement avulsive, the Arizona
40. 414U.S. at 316.
41. The question was of some consequence. Approximately 70 acres of the east
half of the parcel was still covered by the river or was now in Nevada as a result of
the river's movement and, therefore, not bound by the outcome of the Arizona action.
But the disputed Arizona land consisted of approximately 150 acres of land formerly
covered by the river. Moreover, the area surrounding the land had been improved
and developed into a recreational area and had greatly increased in value. Petitioner's
Brief at 49, Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
42. Accretion is the "process by which the area of owned land is increased by the
gradual deposit of soil due to the action of a bounding river, stream, lake, pond, or
tidal waters." 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 983 (1971). Thus, a
riparian owner acquires whatever accretion attaches to his or her land, and the
boundary is moved to accommodate this increase. Several rationales are offered for
the doctrine. It permits the boundary to follow the stream bank, a desirable result
since it allows land originally riparian to remain so, assuring the upland owners the
advantage of access to the water. It also allows a body of water which constitutes a
legal boundary to remain the boundary, even as it moves. In addition, as noted by
the Court in Bonelli, it serves the function of compensating owners for any losses of
land due to erosion by the river. 414 U.S. at 326. See also 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY § 1219 (3d ed. 1939); Note, Artificial Additions to Riparian Land: Ex-
tending the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 315, 322-23 (1972).
As a general rule, if accretion is produced or hastened by artificial constructions,
the doctrine still applies, providing the benefited owner is not responsible for the inter-
ference. Thus, in United States v. Claridge, 416 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1969), the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that erection of Hoover Dam did not alter application
of the accretion doctrine because it was not erected for the purpose of causing ac-
cretions and was an insignificant factor in the process. Accord, Beaver v. United States,
350 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1965).
43. Avulsion may be defined as the sudden and violent removal of land by the
water's action. In the case of a river, it may involve the stream suddenly and per-
ceptibly abandoning its old channel. 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 42, at § 1222. Avulsive
shifts do not result in changes of boundaries; the old boundary, which in the case of
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Supreme Court held that the boundaries did not change and that the
State of Arizona owned the land in question. 44
A. The Federal Question
In framing the issue as "not what rights the State accorded private
owners in lands which the State holds as sovereign; but, rather, how
far the State's sovereign right extends under the equal-footing doc-
trine,"'45 the Bonelli Court appears to have treated the passage of title
from the federal government to the state as a federal grant of the
submerged land, much like the federal grant to Mrs. Hughes' prede-
cessor in title in Hughes v. Washington.46 In fact, the Bonelli Court
refers to the transaction at statehood as a "grant to the States." 47 But
is it truly a grant? The word "grant" seems to imply a choice on the
part of the grantor to decide whether to convey the land at all. Although
Shively v. Bowlby 48 supports the view that this choice existed as to
private grantees before statehood, the choice disappeared upon admis-
sion of Arizona to the Union; the Court clearly held in Coyle v.
Smith 49 that Congress is without authority to withhold from new
states any power or aspect of sovereignty held by the original states.50
In addition, even if one accepts the Court's statement that Arizona
received its land by a federal grant, under Joy v. St. Louis51 a federal
question does not arise merely because the grantee can trace title to a
federal patent. In Joy, the Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction
a river would be the old channel, remains the boundary. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S.
359 (1892). The rationale for the avulsion rule is that in fixing their boundary with
reference to the water, the owners of the riparian land were aware of the probability
that the boundary could change gradually over the years, but did not have in mind
the possibility of a sudden and imperceptible change. 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 42, at
§ 1222. In close cases, when it is difficult to determine whether the movement was
perceptible and sudden, courts presume that the movement was by accretion or erosion,
reasoning that it is easier to prove a sudden, visible change than a gradual, imper-
ceptible one. See Hall v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 158 Colo. 201, 405 P.2d 749,
750 (1965).
44. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699, 703 (1971).
45. 414 U.S. at 319. The Bonelli Court quoted the same language from Borax
that it had used in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967), for the proposition
that a federal court can determine the incidents of federal title. 414 U.S. at 320. This
results from an incomplete reading of Borax. See note 36 supra.
46. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
47. 414U.S. at 323.
48. 152 U.S. 1.48(1894).
49. 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911),
50. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
51. 201 U.S. 332(1906).
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where the issue was merely "whether the plaintiff is entitled to land
formed by accretion, which has taken place many years since the
patent was issued .... -52 Thus, unless the issue "really and sub-
stantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity,
construction or effect"53 of a federal patent54 or act of Congress, 55
and the result of the case depends on this determination, there is no
federal question upon which the Court can base its jurisdiction.56
Under Joy, a federal court's role is limited to determining the
boundary at the time of the grant and before statehood. By holding
that the Court has jurisdiction to decide the effects of post-patent
movements of the river on the boundaries of federally granted land
because the federal government is the source of title, the Bonelli Court
has impliedly overruled Joy and created a new federal question of
doubtful validity.57
B. The Federal Common Law Applied in Bonelli
1. The public purpose limitation to the state's title to submerged
lands
The Bonelli Court delineated a public trust doctrine which limits
the state's title to submerged beds. In short, the state's title is subject
to a trust to protect public navigation, commerce, fishery and certain
other public purposes such as conservation. 58
52. Id. at 342.
53. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912).
54. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 28 (1935) (construction of grants by the
United States is a federal not a state question).
55. Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 489 (1917).
56. This doctrine was reaffirmed most recently in dicta in Oneida Indian Nation
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974). There the Court distinguished the case at
bar from the general rule that "a controversy in respect of lands has never been re-
garded as presenting a Federal question merely because one of the parties to it has
derived his title under an act of Congress." Id. at 676, quoting Shulthis v. McDougal,
225 U.S. 561, 570 (1912), and citing Florida C. & P.R. Co. v. Bell, 176 U.S. 321,
328-29 (1900); Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1906). In Oneida, the asser-
tion of federal controversy was held to depend upon "the not insubstantial claim that
federal law now protects, and has continuously protected" the petitioner Indian tribe's
possessory right to tribal lands. 414 U.S. at 677.
57. In Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 49 (1894), and Borax, the Court held that the United States conveyed
fastland down to the high water mark on navigable bodies of water, as determined at
the time of statehood. In Bonelli, the Court appears to have determined the boundary
not at the time of statehood, but rather as affected by the movement of the Colorado
River in years following.
58. 414 U.S. at 323 n.15. See also Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
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The public trust doctrine was first formulated in Illinois Central
R.R. v. Illinois.59 In that case, the Court held that a state could
convey land beneath navigable waters only if such a conveyance
would not frustrate the purpose of the public trust. Any conveyance of
such property was deemed subject to revocation by the state if the
public interest was impaired. The Bonelli Court, however, modified
that doctrine by indicating that if a state no longer needs re-exposed
lands to fulfill the public trust, the state may not keep the land:60
[TI he advance of the Colorado's waters, divested the title of the up-
land owners in favor of the State in order to guarantee full public en-
joyment of the watercourse. But, when the water receded from the
land, there was no longer a public benefit to be protected; consequent-
ly, the State, as sovereign, has no need for title.
Thus, the state's title to the land is defeasible in favor of the riparian
owner when it is no longer submerged and no longer protects a public
benefit. By this strange result, the federal government, through its
courts, retains a measure of control over state-owned submerged land,
inconsistent with the equal footing doctrine and the Court's reasoning
in Coyle v. Smith.6 1
The Court also stated in Bonelli that "[t] he State's title is to the
'[river] bed as a bed' . ."62 This language, read in context, ap-
pears designed to support the denial of the "windfall" which would
accrue to Arizona by reason of the Arizona Supreme Court's finding
that the re-emergence had been avulsive under state law.63
2. The new federal common law of accretion
In discussing the applicable federal law, the Bonelli Court detailed
the generally accepted views of the accretion and avulsion doctrines
and their underlying rationales. The applicability of these doctrines to
particular fact situations is obscured, however, by the Supreme Court's
59. 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892).
60. 414 U.S. at 323-24.
61. 221 U.S. 559 (1911); see text accompanying notes 10 & 50 supra.
62. 414 U.S. at 322 (footnote omitted).
63. Indeed, the Court stated:
Because of the limited interest of the State in the former riverbed, we have held
the doctrine of avulsion inapplicable to this suit between the State and a private
riparian owner, who is seeking title to surfaced land identifiable as part of his
original parcel. In that sense, we have embraced the re-emergence concept.
Id. at 330 n.27.
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equal footing analysis.
The federal law of accretion, the Court stated, must be applied with
a view to the limited nature of the state's rights in the riverbed. Ari-
zona holds title to the bed of navigable streams "in trust for the public
purposes of navigation and fishery,"64 as well as to protect the public's
right to enjoyment of the watercourse. Under the Court's analysis, the
equal footing doctrine limits Arizona's interest in the land to the pro-
tection of those public rights. Thus, if reliction exposes and dries the
land and there is no public benefit to be protected, the state's retention
of the land can, according to the Court, only result in a windfall not
intended by the equal footing doctrine. In essence, in order to avoid
awarding this "windfall" to the state, the Court was compelled to re-
ject the Arizona court's holding that the change was avulsive since
application of the avulsion doctrine would leave Arizona with the
former river bed.65 The Court ruled that the doctrine of accretion ap-
plies because the accretion rule supports the result favored by the
Court.66 By this result-oriented and cavalier treatment of the doctrines
of avulsion and accretion, the Court effectively gutted the traditional
distinctions between the two doctrines. Before Bonelli, even a federal
court was required to determine factually whether the movement of
the river was slow and imperceptible or rapid and visible. If it were the
the former, the movement was accretive; if the latter, the movement
was avulsive. In reversing the factual finding of the Arizona Supreme
Court that the movement was avulsive, and in refusing to apply the
traditional factual method67 of distinguishing between the two doc-
trines, the Bonelli Court effectively denied the states power "to decide
[a] controversy under [that] law.., in a way that [the Court] might
think is wholly wrong. '68 The new doctrine comprehends a type of ad
hoe interest balancing whereby windfalls, public purposes, traditional
principles of property law and possibly other factors heretofore un-
known are weighed and applied as the Court sees fit. 69
64. Id. at 321-22, quoting Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,381 (1891).
65. See note 43 supra.
66. 414 U.S. at 328-29.
67. Id. at 330 n.27. For earlier decisions applying traditional accretion rules, see
County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874); Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
68. 414 U.S. at 337 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
69. In addition, if the application of federal law is based on the federal nature of
the project or upon the fact that commerce clause powers were executed, it is at least
arguable that Congress, not the federal courts, should decide the consequences of any
river movement produced by the project.
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III. THE EFFECTS OF BONELLI
A. The Future of the Equal Footing Doctrine
The Court, by holding that federal law governs a dispute con-
cerning ownership of re-emerged land along the Colorado River, has
virtually emasculated the equal footing doctrine. As dissenting Justice
Stewart noted, the Court's source of title analysis would not work in
the original 13 states or Texas, where the federal government is not
the source of title.70 In short, the original 13 states and Texas have the
right to decide the legal consequences of the movement of a navigable
stream, but Arizona and 35 other states do not. 71 This result, Stewart
noted, is clearly contrary to the theory and purpose of the equal
footing doctrine.
B. The Effects on Substantive Property Rights
The wisdom of our federal system, in which state substantive law is
presumed to govern absent constitutional preemption,72 Congressional
action or interstitial federal adjudication, 73 becomes most apparent
when federal courts ignore the delicate balance of that system to "cre-
ate" substantive federal law.
After Bonelli, federal law now intrudes uncertainly upon property
law in all but the original states and Texas.74 The Bonelli Court rea-
70. 414U.S.at336.
71. The upshot of the Court's decision is that the 13 Original States are free to
develop and apply their own rules of property law for the resolution of conflict-
ing claims to an exposed bed of a river, while those States admitted after the Con-
stitution's ratification must under today's decision knuckle under to this Court's
supervisory view of "federal common law."
Id. at 336 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
72. See note 25 supra.
73. Federal law is interstitial in nature:
It builds upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting
them only so far as necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts, in short,
against the background of the total corpus juris of the states in much the same
way that a state legislature acts against the background of the common law, as-
sumed to govern unless changed by legislation.
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 471 (2d ed. 1973).
74. A Washington case analogous to Bonelli involved the lowering of Lake Wash-
ington in the early 1900's. In Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 P. 19 (1911), the
Washington Supreme Court held that upland owners had no right to the newly ex-
posed land resulting from the lowering of the lake in connection with a federal
project. Since Washington's source of title to the lakebed was the federal government.
under the Bonelli rule federal law would have controlled. The manner in which the
Bonelli Court balanced interests leads one to conclude that, had the facts in Bilger
been before the Bonelli Court, the upland owners, not the State of Washington. would
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soned that title to the re-exposed land must be in the federal grantee,
or his or her successor, "[b] ecause of the limited interest of the State
in the former riverbed. '7 5 Although the warranty deed which con-
veyed the land to Bonelli included nearly all the re-emerged land in its
description,76 arguably both grantor and grantee assumed that only
the remaining 60 acres of dry land were being conveyed. Moreover, it
seems unfair to give the land to Bonelli since, in 1950, it could have
purchased only the 60 acres because the submerged land was owned
by Arizona as part of a bed of a navigable river. In brief, the warranty
deed to Bonelli included rights which were neither envisioned by the
parties to the transaction nor allowable under the law at the time of
purchase. The Court's decision in Bonelli necessarily clouds property
titles in the great majority of states wherever a navigable river has
changed course; the ownership of any land affected by the wanderings
of a navigable river will be determined under the Bonelli rule of fed-
eral common law interest balancing. In the future, every federal proj-
ect involving a navigable waterway may result in a change of owner-
ship.
Although the Bonelli Court specifically refrained from determining
the law applicable to an action between private parties, 77 the state's
title in a riverbed is such that it can be conveyed to a private owner.
7 8
Since Arizona cannot convey any greater title than it has, and since
its title is governed by federal law, it follows that the federal law cre-
ated in Bonelli must govern private disputes where one party can
trace title to the state.79 If, in fact, federal law does not apply to dis-
putes between private individuals tracing their title to the state, then
in the future, in order to avoid the application of Bonelli, a state should
convey the land to a private individual. Such a circumvention of Bo-
nelli, however, would totally vitiate the rule it purports to adopt.
probably have received title to the land exposed in order to avoid awarding the state
any windfall. Since Washington has a great deal of federally-patented land fronting on
navigable bodies of water, broad aiiplication of Bonelli would have far-reaching im-
pact on this state's property law. Bilger is distinguishable in that none of the land in
dispute had ever been dry land. The lake's level dropped for the first time as a result
of the canal project. Thus, there were no re-emergence equities with which to deal.
But the respondents in that action were federal grantees. Id. at 463, 116 P. at 22.
75. 414 U.S. at 330 n.27.
76. Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Bonelli Cattle Company v.
Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
77. 414 U.S. at 330 n.27.
78. See Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894).
79. This result was noted by Justice Stewart in dissent. 414 U.S. at 332 n. 1.
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Yet, the confusion surrounding conveyance of state lands to pri-
vate parties exists in a more legitimate sense. Many states have already
conveyed and will continue to convey certain interests in submerged
lands, such as mineral leases, for legitimate purposes not impairing
the public trust. If the submerged land on Bonelli's parcel had been
subject to an oil lease,80 would its re-exposure divest the private
lessee? Since the state's interest under Bonelli is limited to the riverbed
as bed, then the lessee might lose its investment, and a riparian in the
position of Bonelli would be unjustly enriched.
These and other questions raised by Bonelli will give rise to much
litigation. Undoubtedly, natural and artificial processes have exposed
many areas of submerged tide and shorelands and left them situated
above receding high water marks. State grantees whose titles to such
land have been clouded will attempt to clear their title by court ac-
tion. Upland owners whose water access has been cut off by receding
water and dredging spoil piled along the shore, will see in Bonelli a
chance to increase their ownership.
Moreover, states have little power over agencies which alter river
movement. Neither nature nor the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers, which is responsible for dredging navigable channels, 8 1 is ame-
nable to state control.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Bonelli decision represents an overly broad and unjustifiable
expansion of federal law into the real property area. It clouds the title
of nearly all property riparian to navigable waters in all but the orig-
inal states and Texas, resurrects the old ghost of pre-Erie federal
common law and the problems that spectre involved, and destroys the
equality between states necessary for the Union by undercutting the
equal footing doctrine. It has done all this without a solid constitu-
tional basis.
In the final outcome, the Court should limit Bonelli to its peculiar
facts, as it apparently has Hughes v. Washington.82 The application
of Bonelli's unusual rationale in future cases would lead to great prob-
80. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), involving oil leases along the
Colorado and other rivers in Utah.
81. 33 U.S.C. §§ 540, 603(a) (1970).
82. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
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lems, with few corresponding benefits. Justice Brandeis was correct:
No clause in the Constitution confers upon the federal courts the
power to declare the substantive rules of common law applicable in a
state; any interference with either the legislative or judicial action of
the states, except as permitted by the Constitution, is "an invasion of
the authority of the state, and, to that extent, a denial of its independ-
ence."
8 3
Richard A. Hopp
83. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
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